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Introductory Remarks by Walter Ileller
I want to add my welcome to the fourth colloquium of the National
Bureau's Fiftieth Anniversary series. I doubt that there's been such a
gathering of the public finance clan since the occasion of the late Harold
Grove's sixty-fifth birthday party. It is particularly appropriate that this
colloquium should be dedicated to Harold's memory. Not only did he
play an important role in the Bureau, but he devoted much of his pro-
fessional lifetime to the stated purpose of these colloquia, namely, "to
consider future research needs in light of present and anticipated policy
problems." And he spawned no less than sixty-one Ph.D.'s during his
career to help him with that quest!
By way of brief tribute to Harold's contributions and also as a
reminder of how the public finance agenda has changed in the past
thirty or forty years—and yet remains in many respects the same—I
thought it might be interesting to quote just a few passages from his
1933—34 series of tax articles in the New Republic, which are classics.
I divide these quotes into three categories.
The first was love's labor lost: "It now seems very clear," said he
in 1934, "that we have reached the point where we can no longer afford
the leaks and special privileges in our tax system which have been so
abundantly demonstrated to exist. To mention only one of those leaks
and privileges, what about the huge volume of tax-exempt interest?
Second," he said in this connection, "those who fear the cumulative
effect of federal and state income taxes should endorse the suggestion
frequently made that the federal government give the taxpayer a credit
against his federal tax for any income taxes that he pays the state." (I
thought that the federal credit should have equal time with tax-sharing.)
And then, "If the states wish to make the property tax more in accord62 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
with ability to pay, they can do so by making it apply to the 'net worth'
of the taxpayer, including all assets, both tangible and intangible." A
bold man was Harold.
The second category is virtue rewarded. In "Yachts Without In-
come" (what a great title!), he said the greatest single gap in the tax
system was the unrestricted deductibility of capital losses, which per-
mitted J. P. Morgan to have—you guessed it—yachts without income.
Then he manfully put himself in the same class as J. P. Morgan by
calling for an end to exemption of government salaries, including his
own as a state university professor; the Congress obliged.
And then there is the third category, the changing agenda. He called
for a tax on undistributed profits as well as a permanent excess profits
tax. And he made the typical pre-Keynesian call for higher federal
taxes to cut the deficit and sustain our money and credit. Now on the
last point let me hasten to Harold Groves's defense with the following
quote from an appeal by sixty-two members of the Johns Hopkins
faculty to the U.S. Congress in 1932, calling for "the prompt adoption of
a budget balanceable by vigorous retrenchment in the expenditures of
all federal departments and by adequate emergency taxation."
* * *
JamesBuchanan: I suspect that the difficulties that Richard Musgrave
and I face in discussing Carl Shoup's monograph were exceeded only
by those which he faced in writing it.I don't know what Shoup's
guidelines were, but I get the impression from reading the monograph
that his heart wasn't really in it. We can perhaps appreciate why the
National Bureau might have had an interest in a summary review of re-
search as a part of its Fiftieth Anniversary. But in this age where we
expose all hypocrisy, perhaps we should also acknowledge that research
surveys a.re rarely of much value unless there is something other than a
commemoration objective to be served. A more effective use of re-
sources, I think, would have been to allow Carl Shoup to write a mono-
graph on a topic of his own choosing. This would certainly have been
more interesting to his discussants, and it might have served a com-
memorative purpose equally well.
But we are not here to dwell on what might have been. What we
have before us is a monograph that purports to survey quantitative re-
search in public finance over a half-century period. Now I like to think
of a technically competent nonspecialist who might read this monograph.Public Expenditures and Taxation 63
And I should like to ask what impressions this nonspecialist would get
about public finance and its development over the period from reading
this monograph. In this connection I submit that the survey does provide
a misleading and distorted picture of what has been and is happening in
public finance. We have witnessed the transformation of what was a
dull, unimaginative, extremely limited, and almost irrelevant subdiscipline
into one of the most exciting areas in political economy. Yet this mono-
graph fails to convey more than a trace of the revolution that has taken
place. A nonspecialist reader would get the impression that public finance
economists have continued to work with the same old problems, the
only change being the employment of more and more sophisticated tools.
Furthermore, he would have to conclude that, while some progress
seems to have been made around the edges, nothing much has been
accomplished by way of concrete results. And this nonspecialist reader
of the survey would then surely not place a very high value on research
prospects.
Now, what is the trouble? Is the over-all impression so misleading
because Shoup has chosen to concentrate his attention on quantitative
public finance research, which he juxtaposes against qualitative or
theoretical research? It seems to me that this offers us only a small part
of the answer. What has really happened in public finance is that our
paradigms have been modified. We simply do not look at the subject
matter of this subdiscipline in the same way that we did thirty years ago.
And let us ask. the question, what was public finance like thirty years
ago? There were, of course, both positive and normative parts or elements
of it. When I was a graduate student positive public finance consisted in
analysis, almost exclusively nonquantitative, of the shifting and incidence
of taxes. We tried to explain the effect on private economic behavior
of individuals and firms that was exerted by the levy of taxes of different
kinds and different magnitudes. And, as Shoup's monograph properly
indicates, we're still trying to do this, but without having made much
progress. In those days, normative public finance embodied the so-called
"principles of taxation," a value-laden and extremely naive discussion
about how taxes should be imposed. I think it is fair to say that public
finance in those days was not political economy at all. The positive
aspects were simply applied Marshallian price theory. Public finance did
not embody a study of the public economy.
Today, by contrast, public finance is public economics. It is the
economics of government, the study of the allocation of resources
through public or collective decision processes. It is this incorporation64 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
of public choice that has made the dramatic difference in public finance.
In one sense you could say that we put the word "public" back in the
name. In another sense we could say that English-language public finance
has made up a half-century lag that existed before World War II be-
tween its own level of sophistication and that of the Europeans. The
contribution of Wicksell, Lindahi, and the Italians has now become a
central part of the modern public finance tradition. And this change has
come about through both normative and positive approaches. Such men
as Musgrave, Bowen, and Samuelson showed us how welfare conditions
for public sector allocations could be derived from individual evaluations.
Alongside this, such men as Kenneth Arrow, Duncan Black, and An-
thony Downs begin to show us the positive results of attempts to com-
bine individual evaluations into collective outcome. Surprising as that
may seem to us here today, public finance economists have come to look
on governments as being made up of ordinary men only within the past
two decades. Only within those two decades has a serious analysis of
the actual workings of the bureaucratic process been commenced by
such people as Gordon Tullock, Anthony Downs, Roland McKean,
William Niskanen, and others. I think we have indeed come a long, long
way; so far, in fact, that the study of public economy now includes as
only one part, and a relatively small part at that, the traditional problems
of tax shifting and incidence. It therefore seems to me little wonder that
Shoup's summary survey should be somewhat misleading in its concen-
tration on what has now come to be a small part of a much larger and
more important subject. Most of you who know my own approach to
public finance could have predicted this to be my general response. I
have summarized it here because there are, or so it seems to me, quite
important implications for public finance research. I think we have no
more than scratched the surface of investigation into just how govern-
mental processes do, in fact, work. I think there is a veritable mine to
be exploited here, and we can point to only a handful of empirical con-
tributions. Let me mention just one or two. How are budgets actually
made? Surely the Davis-Dempster-Wildavsky results cannot be ignored
when people start asking that question. How do regulatory commissions
actually work? The research efforts of George Stigler and his cohorts
must remove some of the naiveté from some of the people who ask that
question. We need hard-headed empirical research into the workings of
every constitutional or legislative assembly, court, bureau, agency, com-
mission, and committee of every level of government in the land.
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it does not require complex or complicated techniques, and it will
scarcely excite the young economist who has a set of fancy tools and no
ready-made places to apply them. The research tools needed are the
simple motivational assumptions that the economist carries around with
him along with a hard-headed critical understanding of the way that
actual and political collective-decision institutions function. We have too
long neglected institutional considerations. I would personally like to see
far more institutional analysis reintroduced into public finance and into
economics generally. And I was a little impressed by Shoup's remarks
where he called for research on the workings of the tobacco industry
and the multiproduct corporations. But neither in his remarks nor in his
monograph did he call for research into the way the government works
and the way bureaus work. I see Roy Blough here, and I am frankly a
little embarrassed when I think back to my reactions to his book The
Federal Taxing Process. I remember that, before I saw the light, my
initial reaction to that book was negative, but that is the type of research
that we need.
What could be expected as the effects of such research even if it
should be undertaken and completed along precisely the lines that I
suggested? I think that we must hold fast to the view that research results
ultimately affect men's attitudes toward policy. If men come to under-
stand more about how bureaucracy actually works, perhaps they will
tend to assign to bureaucracy only those tasks that it can perform with
reasonable effectiveness. Even more importantly, once a better institu-
tional understanding is accomplished, the emphasis can then be placed
on institutional innovations which are designed to foster increasing
bureaucratic efficiency.
It seems to me that modern economists are prone to take either
one of two routes in their research. The larger group undertakes research
in any subject provided only that the data are such as to allow them to
apply their econometric techniques. Karl Brunner calls them "econo-
metrarians." This group tends to be far more interested in applications
of technique than in any substantive results that might emerge. The
smaller group will undertake research in the manipulation of models
whose assumptions sometimes remove them too far from the world of
reality. Of the two, I suppose it is clear that my prejudice is inclined
toward the latter group, but I feel a little guilty sometimes because I feel
strongly that the most productive research lies somewhere between these
two poles. We need empirically based and empirically informed research
into the theory of both actual and potential institutional structures. Let66 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
me give you a simple example. We do not need elaborate econometrics
to explain why hospital costs aresoaringunder medicare. We do need a
rudimentary understanding of the institutional structure of the hospital,
and understanding of the decision processes that are involved, and of
the reward-punishment structure confronted by those persons who must
make the relevant decisions. It's only when we have such an under-
standing that the institutional innovations that are essential to resolve
this cost-increase phenomenon could be expected to be forthcoming.
Of course, each of us would have his own favorite agenda for re-
search, and it is not to be expected that mine would parallel that of Carl
Shoup. Nonetheless, I submit that the agenda that I have just alluded to
does offer a far more exciting horizon to the young scholar and to the
research entrepreneur in the foundation than the somewhat tired topics
in traditional public finance that Shoup has perhaps overemphasized.
Each man should, of course, be encouraged to do his own thing, and I
don't object to further research along the lines which Shoup has called
for. My complaint is really not that he has led us down a false path—not
at all. It is rather that he has failed to suggest that there are more inter-
esting alternative routes to follow in what we may legitimately label
public finance research.
Walter Heller: Thank you very much, Jim. You did exactly what a
discussant should do—injected some controversy, some substance, some
positive suggestions, ofiended young economists, offended old public
finance men, and even threw a few crumbs to us old institutionalists.
Richard Musgrave: I am happy to follow the example of our other
speakers in beginning with a few words about Harold Groves. Shortly
before he died, I gave a lecture at Wisconsin which he attended. I
took the opportunity then to say why I have admired him so much. It
was his positive and courageous approach to the solution of public policy
problems—the kind of attitude which expressed his midwestern pro-
gressive faith that ultimately things can be done reasonably. It was the
same spirit that I admire so much in my teacher, Alvin Hansen, and I
think there is not enough left of it today. I told Harold that I thought
that he and Hansen symbolized what, as someone with a European
background, I had come to think of admiringly as an American intel-
lectual. Of late, too many American intellectuals have become European
intellectuals, which, I fear, has been a dubious gain.
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finance. Carl noted in his introduction that he did leave out fiscal policy,
and that he considered certain aspects of cost-benefit analysis as mar-
ginal. It is, of course, true that the macroeconomics of fiscal policy and
their methodology fit into a different course than the microeconomics of,
say, tax incidence. But we may be going too far toward ruling out all
macro aspects. When I was a graduate student, probably a decade before
James Buchanan, I was taught that the only function of taxes was to be
a deflationary factor in the economy, and at that time the public finance
problem was seen in purely macro terms. Since then the macro aspects
have come to be practically eliminated. But as Shoup points out, we
need a general equilibrium approach to many of these problems, and
this brings the macro aspects back into the fold.
But the very scope of the public finance field makes it increasingly
difficult to hold all its facets together. Why should a student who wants
to study cost-benefit analysis be interested equally in corporation tax
depreciation or in the stabilization aspects of fiscal policy? This is some-
thing which all of us who teach the field encounter increasingly. One
might well say that the only unique aspect of the economics of public
finance—that is, genuine public finance—is the theory of social goods,
normative and positive. This is the essence of public finance as a separate
discipline, and all the rest is the application of various tools of economic
analysis to one or another aspect of fiscal operations. But even with this
narrow definition, the economics of public finance, once an obscure cor-
ner of the science, is rapidly coming to be a central subject of economic
theory, as it is now being taught.
So much for the general problem of staking out the field. Let me
go on and say a word about methodology, because this is one of the most
interesting aspects of the problem which Carl Shoup has discussed.
Certainly, theorizing is not enough. There is a desperate need for em-
pirical work. In most controversial issues of tax incidence and expen-
diture effects there can be a variety of a priori theoretical hypotheses
which are not offhand unreasonable. For instance, you can convince
yourself of a theory of the firm which says that the corporation tax is not
shifted, or of one which says that it is shifted. The answer has to be
found in empirical work. This need is well illustrated by the studies of
tax burden distribution which Shoup discussed at some length and which
I have been working on at various stages, following up the earlier work
of Tarasov and CoIm. The crux of these studies lies in the hypotheses
made regarding the incidence of corporation and property taxes. These
are the two strategic factors, and until we have good empirical evidence68 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
on them, the results are hypothetical. To get further, we must tackle
this empirical job.
Moreover, as Carl points out, we must begin to deal with these
problems in terms of a general equilibrium analysis. It is important, as
he puts it, to consider them in terms of closed systems. This is surely
right. If we ask what happens if this tax is imposed or if that tax is re-
pealed, one must take into account the inflationary or deflationary effects.
To disregard them would not be a very meaningful way of posing the
question. So one should think of incidence in terms of differential effects.
I disagree with Buchanan that incidence is a tired subject. To be sure, it
is extremely interesting to think about how the political mechanism can
be designed to lead to a more meaningful relationship between tax policy
and expenditure policy. I quite agree with that. But the fact of the matter
is that taxes are largely determined and set independent of expenditures,
and that the benefit theory, beautiful though it is, is not easily applied.
Taxes are not voluntary payments, nor need they stay put with the payee.
Knowing what their incidence is thus becomes extremely important. It is
especially important because our society must increasingly face the issue
of income and welfare distribution, an issue which, in my judgment, is
perhaps more serious than any other aspect of public policy.
Yet, the design of the distribution problem is made difficult by our
lack of knowledge regarding differential incidence. The usual studies of
tax burden distribution are subject to the criticism that they look at the
absolute burden of particular taxes rather than at differential incidence.
By assuming pretax income to be unaffected, one may compare a par-
ticular tax with a standard, such as a proportional income tax, and show
the differential. This, however, is really cheating because it does not
produce a solid general equilibrium analysis. As Prest pointed out, you
cannot get around the difficulty by assuming that the distribution of
income before tax is independent of the tax system. But to construct a
general equilibrium model of the Walrasian type which includes not only
all relative product and factor prices but also their relationship to the
size distribution of income is an enormous, if not impossible, task.
Looking back over the decades, I am impressed with the lack of
simplifying genius in the field of microeconomics, such as Wicksell and
Keynes have produced in the field of macroeconomics. Ricardo did have
a beautiful system which gave the key to incidence, but, as Schumpeter
pointed out, its only difficulty was that it was all wrong. There has been
Wairas and his splendid system of n —1equations, a system which is
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cidence issues. What is needed is a breakthrough in terms of a manage-
able system of relative product and factor prices and their relative in-
come distribution, a system which, one hopes, has fewer than 4,999
equations and can yield meaningful results.
This raises the problem of econometric models. These models in-
volve a general equilibrium approach, but partial equilibrium aspects
must be understood to construct them. The initial question to be con-
sidered is: How do the tax variables enter the consumption function?
How do they enter the dividend function? How do they enter the invest-
ment function? It would be interesting to take the various models
(Brookings, Wharton, Federal Reserve/MIT, D.R.I., etc.) and see just
how the fiscal variables are inserted into these various expenditure func-
tions, and what this implies regarding the effects of changes in fiscal
parameters. Study of micro responses to fiscal variables thus comes first,
because it is needed to determine how they enter into the model. Even
though partial equilibrium analysis is not enough, it is needed as a first
stepping stone toward a meaningful general equilibrium model.
Now I come to the most difficult and, in a way, the most important
part of the problem; that is,the contribution to be expected from
econometrics. I believe that this contribution is vital. Notwithstanding
my primary interest in the normative theory of social goods, I know that
governmental action must involve compulsion and is thus bound to in-
duce responses in the private sector. The nature of these responses,
therefore, must be known if government behavior is to be efficient.
Theorizing alone is not enough and finding the answers stands and falls
with the success of econometrics. The empirical science of public finance,
we might as well admit, is largely an application of econometrics. The
specialized aspects of public finance are only a minor part of the problem.
What type of econometric model should be used for public finance
analysis? We appear to be at a point where some disillusionment is
setting in among econometricians as to the usefulness of very large
models. If so, it would be unfortunate for researchers in public finance
to move toward their use. Moreover, the kinds of questions which these
researchers must ask are much more difficult to answer by econometric
models than the questions which the macroeconomists have asked. Given
a large model with substantial lags and many exogenous variables, it
does not appear too difficult to determine what will happen to GNP
next year. Even though models may differ greatly in detail, they cannot
very easily miss, especially if GNP keeps going up anyway. But the out-
come is much less certain if one wishes to determine what happens if70 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
we change the corporation tax rate, or the property tax rate, or even the
income tax rate, or if we adjust this or that item of government expendi-
ture. If you ask these selective questions, the different models will give
strikingly different answers. This is the case because tremendous weight
is now placed on the structural nature of particular equations, the specific
design of which determines the multiplicand generated by a particular
policy measure. Since these particular equations—say, the investment
equation—differ greatly in the different models, it is not surprising that
we get very different results.
I am not saying this to discredit econometric work. I believe that
this is where the future lies. But to improve matters, much more work
has to be done on how the tax variables should be fitted into the basic
functions. The recent debate over the nature of the investment function
was most helpful, and Jorgenson—although he seems to have lost the
now mythical battle at the Brookings conference—made a major con-
tribution in trying to design a microeconomically meaningful investment
function. This was an important step forward, but much more work will
have to be done before the effects of selective policy changes can be
generally predicted.
For purposes of incidence analysis, we must also take these macro-
models and link them to the problem of income distribution. This surely
is going to be a tremendously difficult task. Unfortunately, we cannot be
satisfied any more (as was Ricardo) with studying the effects of various
measures on factor shares. We are interested in their effects on the size
distribution of income, presenting a whole array of problems which do
not even appear in these models. Before the distributional dimension
can be incorporated into the large models, I think that it would be well
to deal with much smaller models in which one can experiment with
these problems.
One of the great difficulties for econometrics in fiscal research is
that, for so many problems, we have to use time-series analysis. Here
we must recognize that, as I should well know, the fiscal variables (e.g.,
corporate tax rates) tend to be highly collinear with everything else. Tax
receipts go up when the buoyancy of the economy goes up and go down
when buoyancy goes down. And when both tax receipts and expenditures
go up, you have an apparently insoluble problem of collinearity. As a
consumer rather than producer of econometric tools, I think that we
must develop more sensitive instruments to deal with collinearity if we
are to get results in this field.
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emphasis has been on the need for large projects, but I would say, as
did the chairman, let the flowers bloom. There is a place for everything.
Important contributions have come from small-scale projects, as, for
instance, Carl Shoup's work on the allocation of police effort in New
York City, Dale Jorgenson's work, and many other cases. Ohe can also
think of large projects which proved extremely useful—for instance, Joe
Pechman's income tax model. So, it seems to me that there is a place for
everything. In research, as in other connections, it is good investment
portfolio behavior to spread risks. When one can have a hundred small
projects or one large project, one has to be pretty sure that the payoff on
the large project is going to have a high probability of return. But
surely there is room for both.
Finally, just a word with regard to what I think are some of the
most important problems to work on. In reading the New York Times to-
day, I learned that the administration may be thinking of an expanded
revenue-sharing plan, not on a $4 or $5 billion but on a $10 or $15
billion scale. It seems to me that we are embarrassingly unprepared to
deal with this problem. As I see it, the most important problem to be
resolved at this point is to find some way of measuring not only the fiscal
capacities but also the fiscal needs of the various jurisdictions. This is a
difficult and messy issue, but I think it is one of the most important
problems to be tackled.
Another issue which is most important from a current point of view
concerns the incentive effects of the negative income tax. This is a field
where, as Carl mentioned, some experimentation has taken place. While
it appears that the experiment has not been very successful, this is cer-
tainly an area where work need be done. A third area of increasing
interest, like it or not, is the possibility of substituting a value-added tax
for the corporation income tax or other taxes. To do this, we need some
greatly simplified macromodels containing the relationships most impor-
tant for this purpose but cutting out excessive details. Some work of that
sort would be most helpful, particularly if available by the time of Con-
gressional consideration. The analysis of tax incidence, especially for
the corporation tax and property tax, is something that has to be con-
tinued. I agree with my critics that, in order to get at the corporation tax
problem, a more disaggregated model is needed and one which introduces
some explicit assumptions about the pricing behavior of firms. The dif-
ficulty is that, to do a good job, detailed information is required on
costs and prices, that products have to be defined over time, and so forth.
Basic data work may have to be undertaken before much estimating can72 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
be done. As Buchanan suggests, the analysis of bureaucracy, of how
government works, is also a challenging and important problem. Perhaps
one of the best things in our, field is that there is great variety, with
different people interested in different things. The best bet, I believe, is
that good researchers, left to their own interests, will find the most
promising problems. Research foundations should respond to these
interests, rather than guide them.
Walter Heller: Thank you, Dick, for a fascinating discussion. You did
just what a second discussant should do, namely, disagree with both
the speaker and the first discussant. The agenda of unfinished business
gets longer and longer. 1 should also note that there were some very good
practical inferences that can be drawn from what you said, namely, that
Wilbur Mills and John Byrnes can wait until they have the results of
your analysis before they change their opposition to revenue sharing. I
imagine that will be rather reassuring to them. Of course, the real ques-
lion is, will the Congress wait, will it heed?
Now before we turn to defenders of econometrics and the 5,000-
equation models, we should give our initial speaker a chance to comment
on some of the comments that have been made. Then also, Jim, if you
want to say something in response to what Dick has said I think we
might do that before opening the meeting to discussion from the floor.
Reply by Carl Shoup: I'll try to be brief, although Professor Buchanan's
remarks were all so quotable I hardly know where to begin. But at any
rate, it does seem to me it's a great pity that Jim wasn't born forty years
earlier, and also Gordon Tullock and his other coworkers, so that by
now there would have been a big body of empirical research on their
special interests for me to survey when I wrote my paper. But since
fate decreed otherwise, there wasn't really very much that could be said
on that score.
As to what should be covered in my paper, that, of course, is partly
a matter of choice, partly a matter of assigning relative importance. I'm
inclined to agree with Dick Musgrave, if I heard him correctly, that
shifting and incidence are not really tired topics. Perhaps Jim is tired of
them—I can understand that. We all get in that mood occasionally. But
there is still more to be said in these fields and I'm a little disappointed
that Buchanan himself wasn't excited about extending the fieldof
analysis into government services, subsidies, and so on. What it seems
to come down to is that there's still plenty of work for all of us to do. I
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topics for research in public finance, but there's no reason why he
should have to associate himself with mine.
As to the comments that Professor Musgrave made, I find myself
pretty much in agreement with him, except it is a provocative thought
that we haven't had any genius in this field of microeconomics that
might be compared with Ricardo, Wicksell, and Keynes in macro-
economics. I suppose Dick would be willing to put Cournot in that
category. To be sure, that was a long time ago. Cournot gave us the
framework, we just haven't moved very far from his base—that's the
trouble. But perhaps this field is not one that calls for genius—maybe it
just calls for a lot of hard work from all of us. The task is, as I sug-
gested, even bigger than we yet appreciate. It is to find out how firms
work and what they do.
Not knowing much about it I can speak clearly and say that I'm
in general sympathy with the idea of small models—how small, of
course, is another matter. They should presumably be made small in a
way that allows them to grow. I agree that the ultimate goal is the use
of large models, sooner or later. But we risk a great deal by attempting
to put too much into one large project—the large model. That was not
what I meant when speaking of the large amounts of time and effort
now needed; what I want to suggest, instead, is that for the really
detailed work of finding out what goes on in the business firms of the
world (micro work), we need far more time and more millions of dollars
than we yet appreciate. Until we do appreciate that we will remain
pretty much where we are.
As to current topics of pressing interest, I'm inclined to think that
value-added taxation is going to be discussed, but its chief interest for
us is not as a substitute for corporate income tax but as part of a gen-
eral reform of the federal tax structure, along with a couple of other
tax measures, notably a net worth tax and a progressive-rate spendings
tax. The value-added tax, if it is needed at all,is needed as a chief
instrument for counter-cycle policy, for which I think income tax has
shown itself pretty well ineffective, I'm sorry to say. That's quite a
change in my point of view from four or five years ago. The value-
added tax is certainly a lively subject for discussion, but we should
think of it in a much broader framework. Thank you.
James Buchanan: Thank you, Carl. I want to comment by saying I
withdraw the word "tired."74 EconomicResearch: Retrospect and Prospect
Closing Remarks by Walter Helter
One thing that we can all see in the vast unfinished business of
research in taxation and public expenditure is that Justice Felix Frank-
furter was speaking the truth when he prefaced his remarks in a com-
plex income tax case many years ago by quoting Edmund Burke, to
the effect that "taxation, like love, is not founded wholly on reason."
That certainly isstill true today. By the way, in his dissent in that
particular tax case, he went on to say, "This is a plain, unvarnished,
luscious bonanza of a windfall." We can stand a little more of that kind
of plain speaking in Washington even now.
I